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1. Introduction
We explore new mechanisms to fund long-term care using housing wealth. Our research in this
area is motivated by the following trends and policy challenges. In both developed and
developing countries worldwide, there is a growing demand for long-term care services that
exceed available funding. Health insurance programs often cover only basic long-term care
costs (if at all) and few countries have public long-term care insurance programs, while private
long-term care insurance markets are very small. As a result, individuals can face high out-ofpocket costs for long-term care. Simultaneously, many older individuals own their homes, with
their housing wealth often forming the largest part of their household wealth and retirement
savings. However, housing wealth is a lumpy and illiquid asset. Furthermore, individuals often
have a strong emotional attachment to their home, and many prefer to ‘age in place,’ and remain
and receive care in their own home as they age. This ‘ageing in place trend’ has been reinforced
by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on older people in nursing homes.
These trends suggest potential for new public and/or private sector programs that allow
individuals to access their housing wealth while still living in their homes. This paper uses
survey methods to investigate the stated demand for new financial arrangements that allow
individuals to access their housing wealth to purchase long-term care insurance. We compare
the stated demand for long-term care insurance when individuals can (i) only use their savings,
(ii) use their savings and a reverse mortgage loan, or (iii) use their savings and home reversion,
to fund a single upfront premium for long-term care insurance. We focus on reverse mortgages
and home reversion as the two most common types of home equity release arrangements
internationally. With a reverse mortgage loan, a homeowner borrows against their home and is
not required to make any interest and capital repayments until the home is sold. With home
reversion, the homeowner sells part of their housing wealth, receives a payment upfront, and
also receives a proportional share of the sale proceeds when they die or permanently move out.
The long-term care insurance product we tested is a joint life product that pays a regular
monthly income (rather than reimburses expenses) when either or both of a couple qualifies for
long-term care. The income can be used for various purposes, including (but not limited to)
paying formal caregivers, compensating friends or family members for informal care, and
paying for formal residential care.
Our study is based on an online experimental survey that was completed by 1,200 participants
aged 45–64 who live in 49 of China’s largest cities. We find that access to housing wealth
increases the stated demand for long-term care insurance. When they could only use savings to

finance their long-term care insurance premiums, participants used an average of 5% of their
total (hypothetical) wealth to purchase long-term care insurance. When they could use savings
and a reverse mortgage, the survey participants used 15% of their total wealth to purchase longterm care insurance. With savings and home reversion, they used 12%. We also analyzed the
impact of a broad range of covariates on the stated demand for long-term care insurance under
the different funding mechanisms.
Our paper is the first to quantify the stated demand for combinations of long-term care
insurance and home equity release products. Our results are consistent with theoretical studies
which have used lifecycle models to show that the demand for long-term care insurance
increases when home equity can be accessed to finance the insurance premium (e.g., Davidoff,
2010; Hanewald et al., 2016; Shao et al., 2019). We find a larger effect of home equity release
on long-term care insurance demand than a recent theoretical study by Achou (2021). Using a
lifecycle model of single retirees in the US context, Achou finds that housing liquidity has a
limited impact on long-term care insurance demand. His model suggests that, even if housing
were made to be fully liquid, long-term care insurance rates would hardly rise above 10%, from
a 5% baseline in his sample. The larger effect we find in our survey data from China may be
due to a range of factors, including different long-term care risks and out-of-pocket costs
individuals face in China. We also note differences in product design: We designed an income
product that can be used to pay for informal care, while Auchou (2021) considered expense
reimbursement long-term care insurance in his theoretical analysis.
Our study also contributes to the growing body of empirical research exploring the demand for
long-term care insurance. Lambregts and Schut (2020) provided a systematic literature review
of the reasons for the low uptake of long-term care insurance and life annuities. They included
62 empirical studies that analyze long-term care insurance uptake in different high-income
countries. Lambregts and Schut (2020) report that most studies find a positive association
between education, income or wealth and long-term care insurance uptake, while home
ownership is associated with lower uptake (e.g., Boyer et al., 2017, Costa-Font and RoviraForns, 2008, Wu et al., 2021). When housing assets cannot be used as a financial resource to
fund long-term care insurance premiums, housing wealth may crowd out the demand for longterm care insurance as it may be retained for precautionary purposes (Boyer et al., 2017; CostaFont and Rovira-Forns, 2008). Our study is one of the first empirical studies to examine how
access to housing assets via home equity release products impacts the demand for long-term
care insurance.

Our results inform the design of new public and/or private sector programs that allow
individuals to access their housing wealth while still living in their homes. Hanewald et al.
(2020b) discussed how such combined products could be introduced into the US market.
Mayhew et al. (2017) developed a pricing framework for selling a proportion of housing wealth
to purchase long-term care insurance, while Mayhew et al. (2021) evaluated the benefit of
different financing strategies to purchase long-term care insurance. These authors argued that
both a single premium and a regular monthly premium for purchasing long-term care insurance
would severely impact the daily expenses of retirees, particularly for those who are asset rich
but cash poor. Instead, it could be beneficial to finance long-term care insurance through home
equity release, either via a reverse mortgage or home reversion. A program like this could also
be offered by the government; for example, the Australian Home Equity Access Scheme could
be extended to cover long-term care costs (see Sun et al., 2022, for a description of the Home
Equity Access Scheme). By identifying an additional funding source for long-term care, our
findings can also facilitate the development of long-term care services. The additional funding
generated through access to housing wealth could attract more service providers to the market
and may also increase the availability of informal carers who can be compensated according to
the health of the care receiver through the design of the LTCI product.
Our results also inform current policy reforms in China, which aim to increase long-term care
insurance coverage through government-funded schemes and the development of a private
market for commercial long-term care products. In recent years, the Chinese government has
focused on the development and enhancement of the long-term care funding system in various
five-year plans. In 2016, long-term care insurance pilot programs were launched in 15 different
cities and extended to 49 cities in 2020 (General Office of the State Council of PRC, 2020).
Currently, the public long-term care insurance pilot program covers more than 130 million
residents, with more than 1.3 million residents having received benefits from the scheme (Li et
al., 2021). The program focuses on providing basic services or funding for basic long-term care
services and aims to reimburse 70% of the basic long-term care costs. The government plans
to enhance the public long-term care scheme and develop the commercial long-term care
insurance market to supplement the public scheme (General Office of the State Council PRC,
2020). Thus, there is potential to develop the long-term care insurance market in China.
The Chinese government has also shown interest in developing the home equity release market.
Homeownership rates are high, and property prices have increased substantially (People’s
Bank of China, 2020). In 2014, a reverse mortgage program (known as the “House-for-Pension”

scheme) was introduced in several large cities. Although uptake of the pilot scheme was low,
the findings of a recent experimental study suggest a potential demand for simpler and more
flexible reverse mortgage products (Hanewald et al., 2020a). Our results indicate that home
equity release products could provide an additional source of funding for purchasing long-term
care insurance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background
information on public and private long-term care insurance, housing wealth, and reverse
mortgage programs in China; Section 3 describes the survey design; Section 4 reports
descriptive statistics; Section 5 presents the regression analysis of the survey data; finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
2.1 Long-term care needs and insurance in China
China’s population is rapidly aging, and there is a growing need for long-term care. In 2019,
12% of the population was aged 65 or above, and this proportion is projected to increase to 17%
by 2030 and to 26% by 2050 (United Nations, 2020). Assuming current pension eligibility ages
in China, we estimate that the chance of requiring long-term care for men aged 60 is 40% and
for women aged 55 is 30% (see Section B.3.2 in the Online Appendix for detailed calculations).
Long-term care in China is traditionally provided by spouses and other family members. When
Chinese retirees are disabled, they expect their partners and/or children—especially their
daughters and daughters-in-law—to take care of them (Zimmer, 2005; Chappell and Kusch,
2007; Lin, 2014; Scheil-Adlung, 2015). However, the increasing demand for informal care is
met by inadequate supply. There are fewer children available to be caregivers as a result of the
change in China’s population structure associated with the one-child policy, which was in
effect from the late 1970s to 2015 (Rowland, 2009; Ku et al., 2013; Zeng and Hesketh, 2016).
The resulting “4-2-1” family structure—comprising four grandparents, two parents, and one
child—places an increased level of responsibility for long-term care on that single child who
has no siblings to share the responsibility. Moreover, the increased mobility of workers due to
the changes in the labor market has weakened family connections, making it increasingly
difficult for children to provide informal care for their elders (Arnsberger et al., 2000; Ku et
al., 2013; Feng et al., 2020). Less availability of informal care has led to a higher demand for
formal care and unmet care needs.

To address this issue, China is developing its formal care facilities and services. Before the
long-term care plan reform in 2016, most long-term care related services were provided in
hospitals (Mi et al., 2020). In 2016, the central government commenced a public long-term
care pilot program in 15 cities, which was further extended to 49 cities in 2020. Since the plans
and systems vary from city to city, we use Qingdao as an illustrative example. Qingdao is one
of two focus cities for the development of the public long-term care pilot program. The current
system provides two types of services: medical care and daily living care. For medical services,
the public long-term care plan pays up to RMB 1600 per year for mobile clinic care, up to RMB
50 per day for home care services, up to RMB 65 per day for nursing home care, and up to
RMB 170 per day for hospital care. 1 For daily care, the payment from the public plan is up to
RMB 50 per day for daytime nursing home services and up to RMB 65 per day for short- and
long-term nursing home services. These amounts only support relatively basic services.
Individuals or their families have to cover comprehensive services out-of-pocket.
In the private insurance market, only critical illness insurance and retirement village investment
products are currently offered by insurers. 1 The former typically provides a lump-sum benefit
that does not provide an income stream to hedge long-term care risks, whereas the latter does
not provide risk pooling. Since the government aims to further support the public long-term
care scheme, it would be beneficial for it to develop the commercial long-term care insurance
market to supplement the public scheme (General Office of the State Council PRC, 2020). The
research reported in this paper examines the potential demand for long-term care insurance
products that can top up the current government-funded long-term care scheme by using both
out-of-pocket financial wealth and housing wealth.
2.2 Housing wealth and reverse mortgages in China
For most Chinese households, most of their wealth is in housing. In 2019, the homeownership
rate of urban households was 96%, and they held 74% of their total household wealth in
housing (People’s Bank of China, 2020). Furthermore, in the past 20 years, house price growth
in China has been substantial. According to the Bank for International Settlements (2021), the
average annual growth rate for housing prices in China was 7.4% p.a. from 2011 to 2021.

We use RMB to refer to the Chinese currency CNY. The CNY/USD exchange was 0.16 USD on 16 Dec 2021.
China Life Insurance Company, People's Insurance Company of China, Cathay Life Insurance and Kunlun
Health Insurance Company had offered monthly income benefit long-term care insurance products to the public,
but due to various reasons such as low profitability and low demand, these companies now longer offer monthly
income benefit long-term care insurance products.
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In 2013, the Chinese government released a policy document to encourage the development of
a reverse mortgage market. 2 The government strongly recommended that financial institutions
develop new financial products (specifically reverse mortgages) to support retirement
financing, especially the cost of long-term care services. While several insurers obtained a
license to offer reverse mortgage products, only one—Happy Life Insurance—followed
through with the introduction of the “House for Pension” scheme in July 2014. However, this
product has been unpopular, and take-up has been extremely low. The product is relatively
complex and inflexible since it provides fixed monthly payments for life that are partly
structured as a deferred annuity (Hanewald et al., 2020a). The product design remained
unchanged between the launch in 2014 and mid-2021 when this research was conducted.
However, research by Hanewald et al. (2020a) suggests that there could be a higher demand
for an appropriately designed product that provides flexibility for older households to access
liquidity from their housing assets to finance the purchase of long-term care insurance.
One potential concern for developing China’s home equity release market is property rights. In
China, homeowners only own the buildings but not the land. Residential property owners need
a grant contract to obtain 70-year land-use rights, which are transferrable when a property is
sold. However, according to Article 22 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Management of Urban Real Estate, land users (e.g., homeowners) can apply for an extension
one year before the end of the term and may receive a renewal contract for the granting of land
use rights upon approval. Additionally, Article 149 states that the right to use the land for
residential construction should be automatically renewed upon the expiration of the grant
contract. Moreover, Article 359 of the new Civil Code (which came into effect on 1 January
2021) states that the land use rights for residential construction will be automatically renewed
by the payment of fees under the provisions of the law and administrative regulations.
Furthermore, Article 366 of the Civil Code establishes a new right: the right to live on a
property. In summary, property rights and the establishment of the right to live should not
hinder the development of the home equity release market in China.
3. Survey design
We designed an online experimental survey to investigate the potential demand for long-term
care insurance financed from savings and/or housing assets by middle-aged urban homeowners

Several Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of the Elderly Service Industry, which
was issued September 2013.
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in China. The experimental task elicited the demand for three alternative hypothetical longterm care insurance products. All three products provide a monthly income to the policyholder
and their partner if at least one of the couple is disabled and qualifies for long-term care. The
three products differ in the way the one-off premium (paid at the beginning of the contract) is
financed: by cash from savings; by a combination of savings and borrowing against home
equity via a reverse mortgage; by a combination of savings and selling part of one’s home
equity via home reversion.
3.1 Focus group testing
We developed a first draft of the survey based on related studies on the demand for long-term
care insurance (Wu et al., 2021) and reverse mortgages (e.g., Dillingh et al., 2017; Fornero et
al., 2016; Davidoff et al., 2019; Hanewald et al., 2020a). We used focus groups to pre-test the
survey design—particularly the wording and level of detail of long-term care insurance product
descriptions and the format of the choice tasks. The focus group discussions were conducted
by the market research company Horizon Dataway in Shanghai, China, on 20–21 December
2018. The recruitment of focus group participants was aligned with the screening criteria for
the online survey: urban homeowners aged 45–64 with no difficulties in performing any
activities of daily living (ADLs). We provided a script to the moderator from Horizon Dataway
to lead the discussion in Mandarin Chinese. Two focus groups, each with six participants,
undertook a facilitated discussion of the product information and draft choice tasks for 2 hours.
The video-recorded focus group discussions allowed us to considerably improve the
presentation of the product information and the setup of the choice tasks. The focus group
participants asked many detailed questions about the definition of long-term care and how the
hypothetical products work. These questions and suggestions helped to refine the product
descriptions presented in the online survey. For example, the participants asked whether nonpermanent injuries would be covered, which party is responsible for appointing the doctor to
determine the insured’s health state, how the benefits are paid out, and whether the products
provide a death benefit. The participants reported that numerical examples were critical for
them to understand the products and provided some suggestions for the Chinese translation of
the draft survey. We used this feedback to develop our final survey.
3.2 Survey structure
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the final version of the survey. The survey commenced
with screening questions followed by information about health states and long-term care, the

choice tasks, and finally, questions to collect covariate data. We will describe the survey
components in detail in the following sections. The online survey was programmed in English
and Chinese by the survey company dataSpring and administered in Chinese. Screenshots of
the English version of the survey are available in Appendix A. 3 As shown in the screenshots,
we used bold font and red font to emphasize important information. We used blue font color to
highlight technical terms, which were explained via pop-up windows. We also required the
survey participants to remain on important survey screens for at least 20 seconds.

The live survey can be found at:
English: https://pro.wenjuan.com/s2/5d6e41097e634b90c7a7c319/?test_mode=1
Chinese: https://pro.wenjuan.com/s2/5da15ed57e634b50a6b3e6d1/?test_mode=1.
3

Figure 1: Overview of the survey design.

3.3 Sample
The Chinese version of the survey was fielded in November 2019 by the online survey firm
dataSpring to a sample of 1,200 participants. dataSpring recruited the participants through
email and an app from their database of over 1 million Chinese urban residents and from their
network of panel suppliers to expand the reach of their database. The participation rate was
approximately 5–10%. Participants who completed the survey were paid a fixed amount.
Additionally, a bonus payment was based on the results of the product knowledge quiz. The
median completion time for the survey was 19 minutes.

The survey targeted urban homeowners aged 45–64 years, who could be potential customers
for the long-term care insurance products we tested. We included quotas to target 50% males
and 50% females, broad coverage of education levels, and representative geographical
coverage across four Tier 1 cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou) and 45 Tier
2 cities in China. 4 We required 50% of the participants to reside in Tier 1 cities and the other
50% to reside in Tier 2 cities. Tier 1 and 2 cities differ in population size, income level, business
opportunity, and consumer behaviors. We also required the participants to have the urban
“hukou” registration of the cities they reside in since this identifies participants who have a
long-term relationship with the city. We identified homeowners by asking participants whether
they (or their spouse) own at least one property (with an owner certificate). We excluded
participants with difficulties performing ADLs since such conditions would make them
immediately eligible for long-term care insurance benefits and would therefore disqualify them
from purchasing any of the long-term care insurance products.
3.4 Wealth groups
Eligible participants began the survey with nine introductory questions to provide information
that would help us allocate the participants into different wealth groups. Based on the selfreported answers regarding their (net of loans) savings, the current (net of mortgages) values
of their properties, and the tier of the city they live in, participants were allocated into one of
eight wealth groups (see Table 1). The participants were then assigned hypothetical home
values and saving amounts close to their self-reported values.
Table 1: Wealth group allocation.
Self-reported home
value in RMB
≥ 3,000,000
≥ 3,000,000
< 3,000,000
< 3,000,000
≥ 1,000,000
≥ 1,000,000
< 1,000,000
< 1,000,000

Self-reported savings
in RMB
≥ 500,000
< 500,000
≥ 500,000
< 500,000
≥ 150,000
< 150,000
≥ 150,000
< 150,000

City
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2

Wealth
group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Hypothetical home
value (H) in RMB
5,000,000
5,000,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
800,000
800,000

Hypothetical savings
(W) in RMB
750,000
250,000
750,000
250,000
750,000
250,000
250,000
75,000

Notes: This table shows how we assigned participants into one of eight wealth groups based on their self-reported
home values, savings, and the tier of the city they live in. The wealth groups have different hypothetical home
values and saving amounts close to their self-reported values.

The Chinese city tier system is not an official list. We used the definition by the Chinese Business Network
(2021) to determine the tiers of the cities. We grouped New Tier 1 cities and Tier 2 cities into one group and called
them Tier 2 cities. The ranking system is updated on an annual basis, but the Tier 1 cities have remained unchanged
for several years.
4

3.5 Information about long-term care and choice tasks
The participants then saw a screen titled “Facts about health states and long-term care”, which
explained long-term care, health status, and other key technical terms used in the survey in
easy-to-understand language (see Figure 2). We developed this description based on insights
from the focus group testing and previous research (Wu et al., 2021). We provided estimates
for the chance of requiring long-term care for men aged 60 and women aged 55. These ages
correspond to the pension eligibility ages for men and blue-collar women under China’s Basic
Old-Age Insurance program, which covers urban employees and public servants (Deng et al.,
2020). Section B.3 in the Online Appendix describes how we calculated these rates using
individual-level data from two household panel surveys in China: the Chinese Longitudinal
Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) and the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS).
Figure 2: Screenshot of “Facts about health states and long-term care” (translated).

The “Facts about health states and long-term care” screen also included information about
residential nursing home costs. The participants saw different prices according to the tier of the
city they reside in. Participants in Tier 1 cities saw the cost of RMB 11,500 per month, whereas
those in Tier 2 cities saw the cost of RMB 9,500. We estimated these costs based on the average
cost of residential long-term care in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities according to “58 Daojia,” the

national service provider that publishes residential long-term care costs in different cities every
month (see Section B.3.5 in the Online Appendix).
On the next two screens, we prepared participants for the choice tasks. We explained that they
would be asked to make choices regarding three new financial products designed to fund longterm care. We informed the participants that each product would provide them with an income
when they require long-term care. Participants were told that they would see product
descriptions and a case study for each of the three long-term care income products before
completing four choice tasks. We asked the participants to read the product descriptions
carefully and that their understanding would affect the bonus amount they could earn from the
survey (e.g., Hanewald et al., 2020a used similar incentives).
We asked participants to ignore their financial circumstances in the choice tasks and imagine
that they were aged 60 for males (55 for females), married to a spouse aged 55 (60 for females),
about to retire, that they own their own home at a given value, that they have a given amount
in a savings account, and that they have no other assets. We then showed the participants a
hypothetical home value and savings amount close to their self-reported financial situation, as
described in Section 3.4.
3.6 Choice tasks 1–3
As indicated in the overview of the survey design in Figure 1, participants then proceeded to
Choice Tasks 1–3, each of which involved a different long-term care insurance product. Each
choice task consisted of a product description, a case study of the product, and a choice task
for the stated demand. All participants started with Choice Task 1, which was for Long-Term
Care Income Product S (long-term care insurance bought using savings). They then completed
either Choice Task 2, in which participants could use savings and a reverse mortgage loan (via
Long-Term Care Income Products S and R, respectively) to purchase long-term care insurance,
or choice task 3, in which participants could use savings and home reversion (via Long-Term
Care Income Products S and H, respectively) to purchase long-term care insurance. We
randomized the order of Choice Tasks 2 and 3 to avoid potential ordering effects. We used “S”,
“R”, and “H” as the product names to avoid any (positive or negative) connection with existing
financial products. We did not refer to the products as insurance. Instead, we called them
“products” or “contracts.”
The remainder of this section describes other components of the choice tasks.

Product descriptions
Choice Tasks 1, 2, and 3 each began with the description of a new hypothetical product. The
product descriptions consisted of a summary of the product and a detailed product description
in a question-and-answer style presented in table format. Screenshots of all product
descriptions can be found in Appendix A. We explain the underlying pricing in Section B.3 of
the Online Appendix.
The product description for Long-Term Care Income Product S explained that the participants
could buy this product with a single payment from their savings and would receive a regular
monthly income if they and/or their spouse required long-term care. The detailed description
(in table format) explained that Product S was offered by a state-owned bank, would require a
single payment at the start of the contract, would provide a monthly income for life in the case
of being disabled and requiring long-term care services, and outlined other features.
The product description for Long-Term Care Income Product R explained that the participants
could buy this product by borrowing against their home. It also stated that the product would
pay a regular monthly income if the participant and/or their spouse required long-term care.
The description of the long-term care insurance component was similar to that of Product S.
The description of the reverse mortgage component was informed by the mortgage product
description developed by Hanewald et al. (2020a), which reported high rates of product
understanding. We explained that Product R would not require payment at the start of the
contract but would incur a loan that accumulates a fixed interest of 5.8% 5. We also explained
that no repayments would be required while the participant and/or their spouse live in their
home. Instead, the product provider would sell the property at the highest possible market price
after both partners had passed away or moved to a residential nursing home and would use the
sale proceeds to repay the loan. The participants were also informed that if the sale proceeds
were insufficient to cover the debt, they, their spouse, or their heirs would not be required to
make any extra payment. That is, Product R included a non-negative equity guarantee, which
is a common regulatory requirement for reverse mortgages. 6
Happy Life Insurance Company launched the pilot reverse mortgage in China in 2014. At the time when the
survey was conducted , the interest rate charged was 5.5% p.a. In addation, there are several types of fees charged
each year (including lawyers’ fee, policy fee and surveyor fee) and at the beginning of the contract. We estimated
the equivalent interest charged for these fees is around 0.3% p.a. Therefore, we used 5.5% + 0.3% =5.8% p.a. as
the interest rate charged in Product R.
6
Compared to Hanewald et al. (2020a), this product is less flexible as it is only used for financing the premium
of long-term care income product. However, in terms of the no-negative equity guarantee, the right of renting out
the property, and the arrangement of terminating the contract, Long-Term Care income Product R is similar to the
5

The product description for Long-Term Care Income Product H explained that the participants
could buy this product by selling part of their home. The description of the long-term care
insurance component was similar to those for Products S and R. The description of the home
reversion component explained that Product H would not require payment at the start of the
contract. Instead, the participant would sell a part of the home to the product provider. We also
explained that the product provider would sell the property at the highest possible market price
after both partners had passed away or moved to a residential nursing home and that the sale
proceeds would be split between the product provider and the participant, their spouse (if in a
nursing home), or their heirs.
We included several product features in Products R and H that the focus group participants
identified as important. Both product descriptions clarified that the participant would have a
guaranteed right to live in their home while they or their spouse are non-disabled. Furthermore,
the participants would retain full legal rights to their homes and would be allowed to rent them
out. We also included an option for them to terminate the contract early and—importantly—
an option for their heirs to repay the debt (with Product R) or buy back the share of housing
wealth (with Product H) to keep the property when the contract terminates. Focus groups
discussions suggested that these options are important for the acceptance of home equity
release products.
Case study
After each product description, the participants were shown a case study. The case study
illustrated how each product works, using as an example a hypothetical couple in the same
wealth group as the participants. The case study described how the purchase of the product
would impact the couple’s initial housing wealth and savings, the monthly long-term care
income they received when they became disabled, and described the transactions at the end of
the contract. For Products R and H, which involve the use of housing wealth, we described the
outcomes for three possible scenarios at the time of the contract termination to illustrate the
impact of house price growth and the option for their heirs to keep the property when the
contract terminates. Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the case study for Long-Term Care Income

product described by Hanewald et al. (2020a). We reduced the complexity of the current existing reverse mortgage
product launched by Happy Life Insurance by removing the deferred annuity component (both premium and
benefit component) and different types of fees.

Product R. The case studies for Products S and H have a similar structure and are shown in
Appendix A.
Figure 3: Partial screenshot of the case study for Long-term Care Income Product R
(translated).

We randomly showed the participants in each treatment group one of two different amounts of
long-term care insurance purchased in the numerical example to avoid that this amount
influenced the demand for long-term care insurance in the later choice tasks. We adjusted the
financial consequences in the case study accordingly.
Below the case study, we asked participants to rate their understanding of the product described
on the same screen. The five possible answers ranged from Completely clear to Completely
confusing. Participants could only proceed to the next screen after 20 seconds.
Choice task
After reading the case study, participants proceeded to the choice task. In each choice task, the
participants were asked to assume that they have a given amount of savings and own a home
worth a given amount, as described in Section 3.4. The amounts were the same in Choice Tasks

1, 2, and 3. Participants were asked to assume the hypothetical home values and saving amounts
listed in Table 1 to perform the choice tasks, which were close to their reported wealth amounts.
In Choice task 1, the participants were informed that they could use the money in their savings
account to purchase long-term care income with Long-term Care Income Product S. They were
then asked to make the following decisions: (1) Would you like to buy long-term care income
with Long-term Care Income Product S? And if you do; (2) How much of your savings do you
want to use to buy long-term care income? The participants used a configurator to indicate
their choice. The configurator ranged from 0 to the hypothetical amount of savings.
Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the choice task for Choice Task 2. The participants were
informed that they could use both Long-term Care Income Product S and R to purchase longterm care income and were asked to make the following decisions: (1) Would you like to buy
long-term care income? And if you do, (2) How much of your savings do you want to use to
buy long-term care income with Long-term Care Income Product S? (3) How much do you
want to borrow against your home to purchase long-term care income with Long-term Care
Income Product R? As shown in the middle of Figure 4, the participants were prompted to use
two configurators to indicate their choice: one configurator for Long-term Care Income Product
S (range: 0 to the hypothetical savings amount) and one for Long-term Care Income Product R
(range: 0 to 40% of the hypothetical amount of housing wealth). With this setting, we assumed
a maximum initial loan to value of 40% for the reverse mortgage component in Product R. 7

We chose a maximum initial loan to value of 40% based on research by Alai et al. (2014) on the cash flows
and risk profiles of reverse mortgage from the provider’s perspective.

7

Figure 4: Partial screenshot of Choice task 2 (translated).

Choice Task 3 involved Long-term Care Income Product S and Long-term Care Income
Product H. The participants faced the following decisions: (1) Would you like to buy long-term
care income? And if you do, (2) How much of your savings do you want to use to buy longterm care income with Long-term Care Income Product S? (3) How much of your home do you
want to sell to buy long-term care income with Long-term Care Income Product H? Again the
participants were prompted to use two configurators to indicate their choice: one configurator
for Long-term Care Income Product S (range: 0 to the hypothetical savings amount) and one

for Long-term Care Income Product H (range: 0 to the maximum proportion of housing wealth
that can be used to purchase long-term care insurance under home reversion. 8).
The configurators in each choice task were initially set to 0. The participants read: You can
position the slider anywhere on the line, but you need to move it at least once before you can
continue. If you DON’T want to buy Long-Term Care Product, place the configurator at RMB
0. For each choice task, we showed an output table below the configurator(s) illustrating the
financial consequences of the participant’s choices, including the regular income in different
disability states, the required payments, and the remaining wealth (see Figure 4, bottom). The
table also reported the percentage of the cost of formal care or informal care that participants
would be able to cover with the selected amount of long-term care income. The participants
could review their choice and observe how their choice would impact their income and wealth
in different scenarios. The numbers in dark blue changed when the participants moved the
cursor on the configurator. Below the output table (not shown in the screenshot in Figure 4),
participants were asked to select the main reason (from a list of seven possible reasons) for
why they did not purchase more of the respective product.

8

See Section B.3.4 in the Online for the calculation of the home reversion values.

3.7 Choice task 4
Following the separate decisions in Choice Tasks 1, 2, and 3, the participants were then asked
to choose their most and least preferred of the three product choices using a table that
summarized the choices they made in Choice Tasks 1, 2, and 3 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Screenshot of Choice Task 4 (translated).

3.8 Product quiz
After completing the choice tasks, the participants completed an incentivized product
knowledge quiz comprising eight statements (as shown in Figure 6) that tested their
understanding of Long-term Care Income Products S, R, and H. The participants were asked
to select whether the statements applied to each of the three products.

Figure 6: Screenshot of the product knowledge quiz (translated).

3.9 Covariate collection
The final part of the survey asked questions to collect data for covariates, including
demographics and information about children and grandchildren, health and subjective life
expectancy, household income and wealth, financial literacy and numeracy, retirement plans,
financial risk attitudes and personality traits, bequest plans, and expectations of house price
growth and long-term care arrangements. Where possible, we used standard questions to ensure
comparability with other surveys, including the CHARLS and CLHLS. We drew on Lusardi
and Mitchell (2011) for the financial literacy questions, while the numeracy questions were
from Lipkus et al. (2001). Personality traits were elicited using the Big Five personality
questions (Borghans et al., 2008; Agnew et al., 2018). We also included an instructional
manipulation check (IMC), which allowed us to identify inattention by repeating a question in
the survey and asking the participants whether they had seen this question before (Oppenheimer
et al., 2009). Questions eliciting bequest preferences, subjective views on retirement plans, and
house price expectations were adopted from related studies on life care annuities and reverse
mortgages (Davidoff et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2021; Hanewald et al., 2020a). We also measured

the time taken to complete the survey. To gauge the quality of the survey design, we asked
participants to rate the clarity of the survey questions.
4. Descriptive statistics
4.1 Sample characteristics
Table 2 reports the average values for key demographic and socioeconomic variables for our
sample and compares them with data from the nationally representative CHARLS. For this
comparison, we used similar sample criteria to select a sample from the 2018 CHARLS survey
wave. That is, we report statistics for all CHARLS participants aged 45–64 with an urban hukou
(residence permit) who live in a household that owns at least one property. Notably, our study
sample is younger and has more children than the CHARLS sample. Furthermore, the
participants in our survey were more educated and wealthier than those who participated in the
CHARLS. These differences are likely due to the following factors: (i) the interview method
(since our survey was conducted through an online commercial web panel, whereas the
CHARLS used face-to-face interviews); (ii) the sampling method (since the participants in our
survey were recruited from 49 selected cities—four Tier 1 cities and 45 Tier 2 cities—whereas
the CHARLS recruited participants from cities all over China).

Table 2: Participant characteristics: Comparison with CHARLS 2018 data.
Age (mean)
Male
Married
Number of children (mean)
Highest education attained
Junior middle school and below
Senior middle school/college
degree/diploma
Bachelor and above
Current work status
Employed
Retired
Other
Urban hukou
Number of properties
HH savings (median)
HH house value (median)
HH debt excluding mortgage
(median)
N

Our survey
52.1
50.0%
97.8%
1.3

CHARLS sample
55.4
48.3%
91.5%
1.1

17.7%
49.2%

71.3%
24.8%

33.1%

3.0%

84.1%
14.4%
1.5%
100%
1.3
RMB 150,001-250,000
RMB 1,600,000
RMB 2,000 – RMB 9,999

69.5%
31.3%
0.2%
100%
1.5
[RMB 8,500]
[RMB 160,000]
[RMB 0]

1,200

3,867

Notes: HH denotes household. The CHARLS sample was obtained from the 2018 wave of the China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study. [] indicates that variable definitions differ.

4.2 Product familiarity, understanding, and survey clarity
Most participants had heard about reverse mortgages and long-term care insurance before
taking the survey. Overall, 58% indicated that they had heard about a “House for Pension”
scheme (i.e., the reverse mortgage product offered in China, see Section 2.2), while 73%
indicated that they had heard of long-term care insurance.
Long-term care insurance, reverse mortgages, and home reversion are complex financial
products. In Section 3, we described several methods that we used in the survey design to help
the participants better understand these products, including detailed product descriptions with
case studies and pop-up windows with definitions for technical terms. Participants rated their
product understanding following the product descriptions and numerical examples as relatively
high.
Figure 7 reports the subjective product and survey understanding for the full sample and by
product type. 36%, 32%, and 33% of the participants rated their product understanding as
completely clear for Long-term Care Income Products S, R, and H, respectively. In addition,
48%, 49%, and 47% of participants rated their product understanding as mostly clear for Longterm Care Income Product S, R, and H, respectively. Only 1%, 2%, and 2% of participants
rated their understanding as mostly confusing or completely confusing. Overall, 86% of
participants reported that they found the questions in the survey completely or mostly clear.

We used 24 true-false questions to test the participants’ objective understanding of the three
long-term care income products. The data confirm that participants generally understood the
products well, with 17% recording more than 80% correct answers in the quiz and 51%
recording more than 75% correct answers.
Overall, these results suggest that the comprehensive product descriptions and numerical
examples we developed based on previous research and focus group testing allowed
participants to understand the complex financial products well.
Figure 7: Subjective product and survey understanding.

4.3 Demand for long-term care insurance
In Section 3.6, we explained that the survey contained three choice tasks in which participants
indicated their demand for long-term care insurance with different financing methods: using
savings (Product S) in Choice Task 1; using savings (Product S) and a reverse mortgage
(Product R) in Choice Task 2; using savings (Product S) and home reversion (Product H) in
Choice Task 3. The order of Choice Tasks 2 and 3 was random as described in Secion 3.6.

Figure 8 shows that the demand for long-term care insurance varied among the different
financing methods.
Figure 8: Average demand for long-term care insurance.

The demand for long-term care insurance was highest in Choice Task 2 (using Product S and
Product R), where savings and a reverse mortgage could be used to buy long-term care
insurance. On average, the participants stated that they would use 33% of their savings and 13%
of their home value (i.e., 15% of their total wealth) to purchase long-term care insurance. The
average purchase amount across all wealth groups was RMB 384,825 (USD 60,442), while the
median was RMB 250,000 (USD 39,266).
The demand for long-term care insurance in Choice Task 3, in which participants could use
their savings and home reversion (which involved the partial sale of their home) to purchase
long-term care insurance, was also higher than in Choice Task 1. On average, participants
stated that they would use 32% of their savings and 9% of their home value (i.e., 12% of their
total wealth) to purchase long-term care insurance. The mean stated purchase price across all
wealth groups was RMB 308,762 (USD 48,495), while the median was RMB 203,877 (USD
32,021).
Table 3 compares the change in wealth allocation when housing wealth was available to
purchase long-term care insurance. We first compare the difference in demand for long-term
care insurance between Tasks 1 and 2 and Tasks 1 and 3. We also compare the allocation of
savings wealth to long-term care insurance between Tasks 1 and 2 and between Tasks 1 and 3.
We used Welch’s t-test for these four comparisons since we did not need to assume that the
variance of the samples was equal.

Table 3: Welch’s t-test results for differences between tasks.
Test
Mean
Mean
Demand for long-term care insurance
5.2%
15.7%
Task 1 vs. 2
(Task 1)
(Task 2)
5.2%
12.8%
Task 1 vs. 3
(Task 1)
(Task 3)
Savings allocated to long-term care insurance
36.0%
32.8%
Task 1 vs. 2
(Task 1)
(Task 2)
36.0%
33.7%
Task 1 vs. 3
(Task 1)
(Task 3)

D Mean

Test stat

df

p-value

10.5%

31.7

1645.3

< 2.2e-16***

7.5%

27.1

1857.1

< 2.2e-16***

-3.2%

-3.6

2391.7

1.8e-4 ***

-2.3%

-2.6

2395.3

5.0e-3**

Notes: Test stat denotes the test statistic of Welch’s t-test. df denotes degrees of freedom. “D Mean” refers to the
difference in mean between treatment groups. Task 1 refers to using savings to purchase the long-term care
insurance offered. Task 2 refers to using savings and reverse mortgages to purchase the long-term care insurance
offered. Task 3 refers to using savings and home reversion to purchase the long-term care insurance offered.

For all comparisons, we found that when housing wealth (accessed by either home reversion
or a reverse mortgage) was available to purchase long-term care insurance, the demand for
long-term care insurance increased significantly. Furthermore, the amount of savings allocated
to long-term care insurance was significantly reduced when housing wealth was available for
purchasing long-term care insurance.
4.4 Preferred long-term care income products
In Choice Task 4, the participants were shown a table that summarized their choices in Choice
Tasks 1–3. The participants indicated which of the three choices would be “best” for them and
which would be “worst” for them. Overall, 42% of the participants selected their Task 1 choice
as best, while 38% nominated their Task 2 choice, and 20% nominated their Task 3 choice.
The fact that Choice Task 1 was the most preferred on average is somewhat surprising. In
Choice Task 1, only savings could be used to purchase long-term care income, while in Choice
Tasks 2 and 3, savings and housing assets via a reverse mortgage or home reversion could be
used. Thus, Choice Task 1 is a subset of Choice Tasks 2 and 3. The participants likely preferred
Choice Task 1 because it was easier.
5. Regression results
We used regression analysis to better understand the factors driving individuals’ preferences
for long-term care insurance financing using home equity release. We regressed the demand
for long-term care insurance in each task on different measures of product and survey
understanding, the survey treatments, and covariates that have been identified as being
associated with interest in long-term care insurance and reverse mortgages in previous research
(e.g., Wu et al., 2021; Brown et al., 2012; Hanewald et al., 2020a). The covariates included

economic and demographic factors, health variables, and measures of personality and
expectations. We included two variables measuring whether the participants paid attention
when completing the experimental survey: the IMC and the time taken to complete the
experimental survey.
The variable definitions are listed in Section B.2 of the Online Appendix. Most covariates were
coded as binary variables. We converted numerical and ordinal variables to binary indicators
of whether the participants’ responses were higher than the sample median.
Table 4 presents the regression results, where we analyzed the factors explaining long-term
care insurance demand under the alternative funding mechanisms. We measured individuals’
long-term care insurance demand as the percentage of total wealth (i.e., hypothetical home
value plus savings) they used to purchase long-term care insurance. Since the dependent
variable ranged between 0 and 1, we used beta regressions with a logit link function to estimate
the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables (e.g., Ferrari
and Cribari-Neto, 2004). This regression assumes that the underlying data has a beta
distribution, which can be any shape depending on the combination of parameters under the
beta law. We estimated separate regression models for Choice Tasks 1, 2, and 3: for the demand
for long-term care insurance using savings only in Choice Task 1, using savings and housing
assets accessed via a reverse mortgage in Choice Task 2, and using savings and housing assets
accessed via home reversion in Choice Task 3. These results are reported in columns 1, 2, and
3 of Table 4.
In the following discussion, we discuss the association between demand for each of the three
long-term care financing products and the covariates. We compare our results to those of
related studies on the demand for long-term care insurance conducted in Australia (Wu et al.,
2021), Canada (Boyer et al., 2017), France (Courbage and Roudaut, 2008), Hong Kong (He
and Chou, 2018), Spain (Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns, 2008; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016), and
the US (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; Brown et al., 2012; Chatterjee and Fan, 2017; Gottlieb
and Mitchell, 2020; McGarry et al., 2014; Schaber and Stum, 2007; Sloan and Norton, 1997;
Van Houtven et al., 2015). We note that these studies did not assess the demand for products
that combine long-term care and home equity release (as in the present study).
Economic factors: As reported in Table 4, participants with higher self-reported household
savings had a higher demand for long-term care insurance in all three tasks. Chatterjee and Fan
(2017) and He and Chou (2018) also found that individuals with higher net non-housing wealth

have a higher demand for long-term care insurance. The coefficient for self-reported household
savings was largest for Choice Task 1 (LTCI purchased with savings). Households with more
debt would use the Product R and H more than Product S (as the coefficients are greater for
those two products). It indicates that when individuals can access their housing wealth to
purchase more long-term care insurance as they are not limited to their liquid wealth, which is
needed to repay the loans. Furthermore, demand was higher for participants with a lower
household income—while several previous studies found positive associations between
income level and long-term care insurance demand (Schaber and Stum, 2007; Costa-Font and
Rovira-Forns, 2008; Brown et al., 2012; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016; Chatterjee and Fan, 2017).
We note that the product offered in our survey is an income product, while other studies
typically consider reimbursement products. In Choice Task 1, participants with a lower selfreported value for their primary property had a significantly higher demand for long-term care
insurance. This finding aligns with Davidoff’s (2009) argument that housing wealth is a
substitute for long-term care insurance when housing wealth is illiquid.
Demographic factors: Similar to the results of McGarry et al. (2014) and Jiménez-Martín et
al. (2016), there was no statistically significant link between long-term care insurance demand
and age, retirement status, and gender. Married participants (including those in long-term
relationships) had higher demand across all proposed products, which is in line with findings
from Gottlieb and Mitchell (2020), but divergent from several other studies that found no link
between marital status and long-term care insurance demand (Sloan and Norton, 1997;
McGarry et al., 2014; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2021). This might be because we
asked individuals to assume that they were married in the hypothetical scenario in the choice
task and the products offered were joint-life products. Thus, married participants could
probably relate better to the task than single individuals. We also noted that 97.8% of the
sample was married. When a home equity release was available to purchase long-term care
insurance in Choice Tasks 2 (via a reverse mortgage) and 3 (via home reversion), participants
with a daughter indicated a lower demand for long-term care insurance. One of the explanations
is that these participants expected to rely on their daughters to provide long-term care. Notably,
there was no link between long-term care insurance demand and the participants’ number of
children, which is congruent with the findings of McGarry et al. (2014), Van Houtven et al.
(2015), and Wu et al. (2021). We also found that residents of Tier 2 cities had a higher demand
for long-term care insurance.

Table 4: Explaining the demand for long-term care insurance.
Demand for LTCI using Demand for LTCI Demand for LTCI
Product S
using Product S + R using Product S + H
Economic factors
Household savings
Household debt
Household income
Social insurance
Property value
Mortgage amount

0.619***
0.227***
-0.086+
-0.038
-0.288***
-0.028

0.206***
0.239***
-0.129*
-0.064
-0.023
-0.119

0.216***
0.272***
-0.129**
-0.276
-0.081+
-0.147*

Demographic factors
Age
Retired
Female
Married
1+ child
Daughter
Child same HH
College above
Tier 1 city

0.013
0.056
-0.018
0.282+
-0.045
-0.010
0.075
0.043
-0.131**

0.002
0.104
-0.075
0.423*
0.198
-0.093*
0.014
-0.010
-0.144**

0.016
0.073
-0.071
0.611***
-0.153
-0.114**
0.054
0.055
-0.161**

Health
Health
Life expectancy
Smoker

-0.070
-0.046
0.023

-0.014
-0.094*
-0.100+

-0.024
-0.098*
-0.074

Personality and expectations
Financial literacy and numeracy
Awareness of financial products
Awareness LTCI
Awareness RM
House price expectations
Trust in banks
Trust in insurer
Thought of LTC
Intended bequest

0.032
-0.113*
0.067
-0.023
0.034
0.017
0.039*
0.213***
-0.203***

-0.019
-0.102+
0.124*
-0.078
0.142**
-0.002
0.090***
0.264***
-0.273***

0.054
-0.083
0.155**
-0.061
0.118*
0.016
0.084***
0.253***
-0.280***

Product and survey understanding
Subjective Product Understanding
Product quiz
Survey clarity
Passed IMC

0.245***
-0.016
0.024
0.101

0.281***
-0.082+
0.015
0.118

0.292***
-0.066
0.039
0.005

Survey time

-0.018

0.007

0.045

Treatments
Version R
-0.089*
-0.099*
-0.120**
High premium in example
0.059
0.048
0.061
***
***
Intercept
-4.249
-3.279
-3.323***
N
1,200
1,200
1,200
R2
0.183
0.151
0.183
Notes: This table presents the results of beta regressions of the percentage of total wealth allocated to long-term
care insurance on independent variables. Variables are defined in Appendix B.2. +, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively.

Health: Similar to the results of Chatterjee and Fan (2017) and Gottlieb and Mitchell (2020),
we found no significant link between subjective health and long-term care insurance demand.
When home equity release was available for purchasing long-term care insurance in Choice
Tasks 2 and 3, participants with a shorter subjective life expectancy indicated a higher demand
for long-term care insurance. This finding differs from existing studies that found no
relationship between subjective life expectancy and the demand for long-term care insurance
(Sloan and Norton, 1997; Wu et al., 2021). It is likely that participants with a shorter subjective
life expectancy worried more about long-term care risks and thus chose to purchase more longterm care insurance.
Personality and expectations: Participants who were familiar with fewer financial products
had a higher demand for long-term care insurance in Choice Task 1 (only using savings to
purchase the long-term care insurance). This might be because they did not know about other
financial products (e.g., critical illness insurance and life annuities, both of which exist in China)
that could (partially) cover their long-term care expenditure. Participants who had heard of
long-term care insurance before taking the survey had a higher demand for long-term care
insurance in Choice Tasks 2 and 3 (when housing wealth could be used through reverse
mortgages or home reversions). Additionally, participants who had higher house price growth
expectations had a higher demand for long-term care insurance when housing wealth could be
used. Moreover, participants who had thought about how to pay for long-term care expenses
before participating in the survey allocated a significantly higher proportion of their total
wealth to long-term care insurance in all tasks. This result aligns with the results of Courbage
and Roudaut (2008), Brown et al. (2012), and Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016). Trust in insurers
was a significant factor in all three choice tasks, especially when housing wealth was available
to finance long-term care insurance. Furthermore, long-term care insurance demand was higher
for participants who had thought about how to pay for long-term-care expenses before
participating in the survey and for those who were less certain about leaving an inheritance. In
contrast, studies in Western countries found that individuals with stronger bequest motives
have higher long-term care insurance demand, most likely to protect remaining wealth against
high nursing home costs (Brown et al., 2012; Boyer et al., 2017).
Product and survey understanding: Participants with higher subjective product
understanding used a significantly higher percentage of total wealth to purchase long-term care
insurance. The finding of a positive relationship between subjective understanding and demand

for the product aligns with previous studies such as Davidoff et al. (2017) and Hanewald et al.
(2020a).
Treatments: Our survey included two random treatments: the order of Choice Tasks 2 and 3,
and the amount of long-term care insurance used in the case study, as explained in Section 3.6.
The results show that participants who completed Choice Task 2 first allocated less wealth to
long-term care insurance in all tasks (participants were allowed to go back in the survey). There
was no significant impact of the case study treatment on demand.
Summary: Section 4.3 showed that the demand for long-term care insurance was higher when
housing wealth is available to finance long-term care insurance. This section reported plausible
results for the effect of the independent variables on long-term care insurance demand in the
different choice tasks. Our findings largely align with those of existing studies.
6. Conclusion
We conducted and analyzed an experimental online survey fielded to assess the potential
demand for new public and/or private sector programs that allow individuals to access their
housing wealth to purchase long-term care insurance, which pays an income when one or both
of the couples are disabled. In our sample of 1,200 Chinese homeowners aged 45–64, we found
that the stated demand for long-term care insurance in different hypothetical scenarios
increased when individuals could use housing wealth in addition to savings to purchase longterm care insurance. The demand for long-term care insurance was higher when individuals
could access housing wealth via reverse mortgage loans rather than via home reversion, which
involves the partial sale of housing wealth.
We identified the stated demand for all three proposed long-term care insurance products.
When they could only use savings, the participants used on average 5% of their hypothetical
wealth to purchase long-term care insurance. The demand for long-term care insurance
increased when the participants could access their (hypothetical) housing wealth. The
participants allocated an average of 15% of their total wealth to long-term care insurance when
a reverse mortgage was available and 12% of their total wealth to long-term care insurance
when home reversion was available. Our results are in line with previous theoretical studies,
which suggest that the demand for long-term care insurance increases when home equity can
be used to finance the insurance premium (e.g., Davidoff, 2010; Hanewald et al., 2016; Shao
et al., 2019; Achou, 2021). The increase in stated demand for our LTCI income product is

larger than the estimated effect for expense-reimbursement LTCI in a recent paper by Achou
(2021).
We developed product designs associated with the descriptions and case studies that were well
understood. Thus, these designs can be used to develop new public and/or private sector
programs in China and other markets. For example, we included options for the homeowners'
heirs to repay the reverse mortgage debt or buy back the home reversion share to keep the
property upon contract termination.
Furthermore, we used regression results to identify factors driving the demand for long-term
care insurance products in the different choice tasks in our study. Our findings confirm that
economic circumstances, demographic factors, health, personality, expectations, and product
understanding impact long-term care insurance demand. Importantly, we find - in line with
previous studies (Davidoff et al., 2017; Hanewald et al., 2020a) - that a subjective product
understanding is important in determining the stated demand for long-term care insurance.
We acknowledge that our survey sample of urban Chinese homeowners was more educated
and wealthier than a comparison sample from the nationally representative CHARLS survey,
as discussed in Section 4.1. The demand for long-term care insurance and the effect of home
equity release on this demand may differ in the general population. Future research could aim
to collect a broader sample and include individuals living in rural areas.
Overall, our study documented a positive stated demand for new financial arrangements that
allow older homeowners to use their housing wealth to fund long-term care insurance. The
arrangement was described as a ‘financial product’ offered by a ‘state-owned bank’, but the
arrangement could also be offered as a government program similar to the Home Equity Access
Scheme offered by the Australian government.
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Appendix B
B.1 The pilot reverse mortgage product in China
Happy Life Insurance issued an income stream type RM. This contract has an embedded ‘no
negative equity guarantee’, similar to the US home equity conversion mortgage (HECM). The
‘no negative equity guarantee’ property ensures that households do not have to pay anything
out-of-pocket (except the housing asset) to terminate the contract. If the loan account balance
is lower than the house price, the remaining proceeds will be delivered to the heirs of the
household. Therefore, a household can enjoy the upside risk of the house price and the provider
will bear the downside risk of the house price. It is important to note that when a household
enters the contract, a loan account is set up. The loan amount will be settled when the household
sells the property or passes away. The general income stream type reverse mortgage will deliver
an amount of $x per month, and this amount will be added to the loan account. In addition, an
interest rate of r% p.a. is charged each month on the loan account balance.
The product issued by Happy Life Insurance is further split into two streams: ‘with death
benefit’ and ‘without death benefit’. For simplicity, further detail regarding the ‘without death
benefit’ stream is presented. This product splits the retirement period of the household into two
periods; the first N years is termed the ‘deferred annuity premium paying period’ and the
second period the ‘no premium required period’. In the first N years, apart from being charged
$x per month for the benefit received, the household is charged another amount, $y, annually,
and this amount is also added to the loan account at the start of each year. This amount is treated
as the premium for the deferred annuity. After N years, i.e. upon entering the second period of
the contract, the households are neither charged x per month nor y per year, but they are still
eligible to the benefit of $x per month. This is because the amount $y per year in the first N
years covers the rest of the benefit, which is $x per month for the rest of the individual’s life.
This part can be treated as a deferred annuity. The interest rate charged each year on the loan
account is fixed at the start of the contract, which is 5:5% p.a (the current conventional
mortgage rate in China is around 5%). compounded monthly. Only individuals aged 60 to 85
are eligible to enter the contract.
The other stream of the product includes a death benefit. For this stream of the product, the
deferred annuity component of the contract carries a ‘Cash Value’ such that when the contract
is complete, the heirs of the household are eligible to receive the ‘Cash Value’ as a bequest.
Therefore, the deferred annuity annual premium will be higher than the product without death
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benefit. In addition to the annual administrative fee and the one-off notary fee, a transaction
fee and lawyer fee will be charged to the loan account. Table 5.5 illustrates the benefit received
and the deferred annuity premium (in terms of RMB) paid by a male with starting age of 60 to
85 per RMB 1,000,000 housing assets.
Figure B.1: Illustrative example of the Happy Life Insurance reverse mortgage for a male
aged 60

Table B.1: Illustrative example of the Happy Life Insurance reverse mortgage for a male aged 60-85 to enter the
contract comparing ‘with death benefit’ and ‘without death benefit’.
Without death benefit
With death benefit
Deferred annuity
premium paying
Deferred annuity
Deferred annuity
Benefit per month
Benefit per month
period
Age
annual premium
annual premium
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

2,544
2,850
2,587
2,911
3,285
3,719
4,226
4,822
4,384
5,034
5,810
6,740
6,128
7,173
8,453
10,036
9,145
10,992
13,343
12,168
15,009
13,651
16,204
14,707
18,672

2,514
2,624
2,646
2,766
2,894
3,031
3,177
3,334
3,372
3,546
3,734
3,938
3,990
4,219
4,470
4,744
4,821
5,135
5,484
5,584
5,989
6,105
6,216
6,344
6,795

7,107
7,830
7,616
8,409
9,302
10,312
11,457
12,761
12,412
13,891
15,595
17,572
17,088
19,348
22,006
25,159
24,472
28,174
32,660
31,754
37,155
36,064
40,298
39,042
46,245

2,124
2,199
2,217
2,296
2,380
2,468
2,560
2,656
2,686
2,790
2,898
3,013
3,054
3,180
3,312
3,453
3,512
3,668
3,834
3,911
4,098
4,191
4,158
4,266
4,441

26
25
25
24
23
22
21
20
20
19
18
17
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
9

85

24,667

7,463

56,710

4,727
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B.2 Variable definitions
Variable

Definition

Long-term care insurance demand
Wealth allocated to
long-term care
insurance

A numerical variable that ranges between 0 and 1, the percentage of total wealth
allocated to the long-term care insurance premium

Preferred scenario
Product S/ Products S
and R/ Products S and
H

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant prefers the scenario in which only
Product S is available/Products S and R are available/Product S and H are available
and zero otherwise.

Economic factors
Household savings

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant reports household savings
excluding all properties (including saving accounts, term deposits, government bonds,
stocks, shares in investment fund) above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Household debt

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant reports household debt excluding
all mortgages (including for example money borrowed from relatives, friends, or
using credit cards, and bank loans other than mortgages above the sample median,
and zero
otherwise.

Household income

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant reports a household income
(including bonuses and pension income) in the last year after paying tax and social
security contribution above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Social insurance

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has social insurance, and zero
otherwise

Property value

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant reports a property value (in RMB
1,000,000) above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Mortgage amount

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has a mortgage amount greater
than the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Demographic factors
Age

A polychotomous variable that equals one if the participant is 45-49 years and rising
by one in five-year steps.

Retired

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant is retired, and zero otherwise.

Female

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant is female, and zero for male.

Married

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant is married (including living in a
long-term partnership), and zero otherwise.

1+ child

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has at least one child, and zero
otherwise.

Daughter

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has at least one daughter, and zero
otherwise.

Child same household

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has a child living in the same
household, and zero otherwise.

College above

Indicator variable that equals one if the highest level of education attained by the
participant is a college degree or above, and zero otherwise.

Tier 1 city

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant lives in a Tier I city, and zero
otherwise.

Health
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Health

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s self-rated health status on a fivepoint scale (1 = excellent … 5 = poor, coded reversely) is above the sample median,
and zero otherwise.

Subjective life
expectancy

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s subjective life expectancy is
above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Smoker

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant is a current smoker, and zero
otherwise

Personality and expectations
Financial literacy and
numeracy

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s financial literacy and numeracy
score based on six questions are each above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Awareness of
financial products

Indicator variable that equals one if the number of the thirteen listed financial products
that the participant had heard of is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Awareness of longterm care insurance

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant had heard of long-term care
insurance before participating in the survey, and zero otherwise.

Awareness of RM

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant had heard of reverse mortgages
before participating in the survey, and zero otherwise.

House price
expectation

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant expects the value of the property
to increase a lot (more than 20%) or increase moderately (5%-20%), and zero
otherwise.

Trust in banks

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s rating of the statement “Banks
can generally be trusted” on an eleven-point scale (0 = Totally disagree… 10 = Totally
agree) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Trust in insurer

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s rating of the statement
“Insurance companies can generally be trusted.” on an eleven-point scale (0 = Totally
disagree… 10 = Totally agree) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Thought of long-term
care

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant has thought about how to pay for
long-term care expenses before participating in the survey, and zero otherwise

Intended bequest

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s rating of the statement “I would
like to leave an inheritance.” on an eleven-point scale (1 = Certainly not … 10 =
Certainly yes) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Product and survey understanding
Subjective product
understanding

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s self-rated product understanding
in Tasks 1, 2, and 3 are all above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Product quiz

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s number of correct answers to the
product quiz questions is above the sample median, and zero otherwise

Survey clarity

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant’s rating of the survey’s clarity on
a six-point scale (1 = completely clear ... 6 = completely confusing, coded reversely)
is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Passed IMC

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant answered the instructional
manipulation check correctly, and zero otherwise.

Survey time

Indicator variable that equals one if the time taken by the participant to complete the
survey was above the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Treatments
Product R first

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant saw Product R before Product H,
and zero otherwise.

High premium in
example

Indicator variable that equals one if the participant saw the example with higher
premiums
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B.3 Pricing of the long-term care insurance products
B.3.1 CLHLS and CHARLS data
We use data from the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) and the China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) to estimate the health transition model.
CLHLS and CHARLS contain detailed information on health status, socioeconomic
characteristics, family structure, and other demographic covariates of the elderly in different
areas of China.
CLHLS is conducted by the Center for Healthy Aging and Family Studies at the National
School of Development at Peking University. The baseline survey of CLHLS was conducted
in 1998 and covered 22 provinces in China. The data were collected from face-to-face homebased interviews and physical capacity tests. The CLHLS targets the elderly aged 80 or above
in the sample cities and rural areas. Follow-up surveys were conducted in 2000, 2002, 2005,
2008, 2011, 2014, and 2018, and these surveys contain replacements for deceased elderly.
From 2002, CLHLS has been expanded to target a broader group of the population, including
elderly aged 65 or above, and collects a large set of health, disability, demographic, family,
socioeconomic, and behavioral risk factors.
CHARLS is conducted by the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University. The
baseline survey of CHARLS was conducted in 2011 and 2012 and covered 28 provinces in
China. The target population of these surveys is elderly aged 45 or above in the sample cities
and rural areas. Follow-up surveys were conducted in 2013, 2015, and 2018.
We designed the experimental survey for this chapter in 2018-2019 and used CLHLS and
CHARLS data for 2000-2015. Our sample includes individuals who are aged above 45 living
in the urban area. The total sample size of the CLHLS and CHARLS is 28,354, but a lot of
observations are in older ages. As the data was not collected regularly, we use the age of each
individual at the beginning and the end of the period to determine the transition period. We
estimate the model using one-year age groups for the age range 65-99. We group all the
individuals aged 100 or above in the “100+” group and those aged below 65 will be grouped
in a five-year interval, i.e., 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64. We estimate separate models for
males and females.
We use ADL limitations as the measure of health states. Six ADL items were evaluated in both
CLHLS and CHARLS: bathing, dressing, eating, using the toilet, continence, and transferring
in and out of bed. Individuals reported their ability to perform these activities using three
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categories: do not need help, need partial help, and need full assistance. We classify an
individual as being able to perform an ADL only if they do not need help. We define an
individual as disabled if he/she has difficulties performing at least 3 of the ADLs. This
definition is one of the triggers of benefit payments for many existing private critical illness
insurance policies in China, such as the policies issued by Ping An Insurance and China Pacific
Insurance.
We calculate the central exposed to risk for both healthy and disabled health states using the
exact interview date, birth date, and death date. If these dates are missing, we use the 15th of
the reported month. We assume that the transitions of health states happened in the mid-point
between two survey waves.
B.3.2 Generalized linear model (GLM)
Following previous actuarial research (Renshaw and Haberman, 1995; Fong et al., 2015;
Hanewald et al., 2019), we consider a Markov process as the basis for modeling long-term care
status transitions and apply generalized linear models to estimate the transition probabilities.
We consider a three-state Markov process as shown in Figure 5.10. The three health states are
“N” (nondisabled), “F” (functionally disabled), and “D” (dead, absorbing state).
Figure B.2: Three-State Markov Process.
𝜎𝜎

N

𝜇𝜇

𝜑𝜑

D

F

𝜈𝜈

We consider four health transitions:
•
•
•
•

𝜎𝜎: 𝑁𝑁 → 𝐹𝐹, the intensity for a healthy individual to become functionally disabled

𝜑𝜑: 𝐹𝐹 → 𝑁𝑁, the intensity for a functionally disabled individual to recover
𝜇𝜇: 𝑁𝑁 → 𝐷𝐷, the mortality intensity for a healthy individual

𝜈𝜈: 𝐹𝐹 → 𝐷𝐷, the mortality intensity for a functionally disabled individual

The transition probabilities are assumed to follow a time-homogenous Markov process, which
is time-independent, and where the transition probabilities only depend on the current state but
not the history. So, we have the following equation:
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑡𝑡) = Pr(𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑡𝑡) = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑖𝑖) .
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(5.1)

Under the GLM approach, there are three components to be specified: the probability
distribution, the linear predictor, and the link function.
Probability distribution: The transition intensities of each one-year age group are assumed to
be constant in a given time interval (between two survey waves), and the number of transitions
is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. In the following, we use the mortality intensities
of a healthy individual at age 𝑥𝑥 as an example to show the relationships of linear predictor and

link function with the intensities. Let 𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥ℎ,𝑑𝑑 be the number of transitions from state 𝐻𝐻 to 𝐷𝐷 at age
𝑥𝑥:

𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥ℎ,𝑑𝑑 ~Poisson(𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 ),

where 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 represents the central exposed to risk of the health state 𝐻𝐻 at age 𝑥𝑥.

Linear predictor: Following Fong et al. (2015), we model the health transitions as polynomial
functions of age. Therefore, the linear predictor is given by:
𝑛𝑛

𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖 ,

(5.2)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑥𝑥 represents the age, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the coefficients to be estimated.

Link function: We use the log link function 𝑔𝑔(∙) as in Fong et al. (2015) and Hanewald et al.
(2019). Following the example above, we have the following link function:

(5.3)

𝑔𝑔(𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 ) = ln(𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 ) = 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 .

Model estimation

We use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters of the GLMs. Let Φ be the

set of parameters. The log-likelihood function is given by (using the mortality intensities of a
healthy individual as an example):

𝑙𝑙(Ω) = ��𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥 ln�𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 (Φ)� − 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥 (Φ)�

(5.4)

𝑥𝑥

We use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to choose the functional form in Equation (2).
We select the model with the smallest BIC value as the preferred model under the proposed
GLM. Table 5.7 shows the BIC of the four nested models, while Table 5.8 shows the
coefficients of the selected model.
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Table B.2: BIC for different nested models.
𝜎𝜎
𝜇𝜇
𝛾𝛾
𝜈𝜈

𝜎𝜎
𝜇𝜇
𝛾𝛾
𝜈𝜈

Model
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

𝛽𝛽0
1,036.37
1,500.77
3,835.29
4,577.01
314.21
460.75
618.98

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥
441.51
568.46
546.23
531.58
296.92
384.82
399.12

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 2
435.69
577.09
644.36
727.17
301.7
388.77
409.57

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 2
438.06
569.48
545.94
469.29
296.47
389.2
401.4

Female

613.21

368.96

374.31

373.34

Table B.3: Coefficients of different nested models.
Model
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

𝛽𝛽0
-5.219***
-6.231***
-6.555***
-9.165***
-1.191***
-1.135***
-3.824***

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥
-6.944***
1.182***
22.599***
-6.826**
3.362***
5.557***

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 2
9.414***
-3.440*
15.165***
7.124*
---

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 2
-5.219***
-6.231***
-6.555***
-9.165***
-1.191***
-1.135***
-3.824***

Female

-3.843***

5.220***

--

-3.843***

After estimating the GLMs, we calculate the health state transition matrix. The following
matrix is an example for a male aged 𝑥𝑥:

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁
𝑥𝑥 + 1) 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁,𝐹𝐹
𝑥𝑥 + 1) 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁,𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥 + 1)
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥,
𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥 + 1) = �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,𝑁𝑁
𝑥𝑥 + 1) 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,𝐹𝐹
𝑥𝑥 + 1) 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥 + 1)�,
0
0
1

(5.5)

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥 + 1) is the transition probability that the individual transitions from health
where 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦,𝑧𝑧

state 𝑦𝑦 to health state 𝑧𝑧 between age 𝑥𝑥 and age 𝑥𝑥 + 1.

Calculation of the long-term care insurance premium
In the experimental task, all individuals are assumed to be healthy and age 60 for males or 55
for females. To calculate the transition probabilities to age 60 + 𝑎𝑎 of a healthy male aged 60,

we use the following matrix multiplication:

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (60,60
(60,60 + 𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝑎𝑎) 𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑓𝑓
�𝑝𝑝ℎ,ℎ
𝑎𝑎

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (60,60
𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑑𝑑
+ 𝑎𝑎)�

(5.6)

= [1 0 0] × � 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (60 + 𝑖𝑖 − 1, 60 + 𝑖𝑖).
𝑖𝑖=1

Each entry of the resulting array is the probability of the transition from healthy to the
corresponding health state at age 60 + 𝑎𝑎 of a healthy male aged 60. Assuming a limiting age
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of 100, we can use the above formula to obtain the transition probabilities to age 61 up to 100
by varying 𝑎𝑎 from 1 to 40.

The long-term care insurance premium is given by the total expected present value of the
benefit, which is the income when the individual becomes disabled. The formula for males is
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ]
E�LTCImale � = ∑40
× 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ,
𝑡𝑡=1 E[𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡

(5.7)

where 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is the discount factor for the cash flow in 𝑡𝑡 years’ time. The long-term care
insurance premium for females is calculated using the same methodology.
The long-term care insurance premium for a couple is given by:
E[LTCI𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ] = E�LTCImale � + E�LTCIfemale �.

(5.8)

We assume a profit loading of 20% so that the final long-term care insurance premium is 1.2
times the expected present value.
B.3.3 Reverse mortgage
The initial loan of the reverse mortgage component is the price of long-term care insurance.
We allow for a maximum loan-to-value ratio at the start of the contract of 40%. In the reverse
mortgage pilot program in China, the interest rate charged is 5.5% p.a. plus annual management
and policy fees. To simplify the fee structure, we assume no additional fees but instead assume
a higher interest rate to capture the fees. We estimate that for an initial loan of RMB 1 million,
for a male aged 60 entered into the pilot reverse mortgage agreement, with a life expectancy of
30 years, the management fee is around 0.3% p.a. Therefore, we use an interest rate of 5.8%
p.a. for the reverse mortgage loan.
B.3.4 Home reversion plan
Assuming a similar product design as in Alai et al. (2014), the home reversion contract involves
selling a proportion 𝜅𝜅 of home equity to the contract provider to finance the long-term care

insurance premium. A lease-for-life is embedded in the contract, which reflects the rent on the
proportion of the home sold. Therefore, the sale proceeds consist of two components, the lease-

for-life agreement and the amount that can be used to finance the long-term care insurance
premium, so the following relationship holds:
𝜅𝜅𝐻𝐻0 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,

(5.9)

where 𝐻𝐻0 is the current house price, and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is the value of the lease-for-life agreement.
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Let the rental yield be the constant 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. In each period, the value of the lease-for-life agreement

would increase if they remain in the property. Assume the house price growth rate is 𝑔𝑔 each
year. Then, the EPV of the lease-for-life agreement is:

𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜅𝜅𝐻𝐻0 × ∑𝜔𝜔−55
𝑡𝑡=1 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × (1 + 𝑔𝑔) × Pr (stay in the homet ) ,

(5.10)

where 𝜔𝜔 is the limiting age, which is 100. Pr (stay in the homet ) is the probability that the
couple will stay in the property for 𝑡𝑡 years, which we calculate as:
Pr(stay in the homet ) = 1 − Pr(moving out t )
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(60,60 + 𝑡𝑡) × �𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑓𝑓
= 1 − 𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(60,60 + 𝑡𝑡) × �𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑓𝑓
−𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑑𝑑

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
(55,55 + 𝑡𝑡) + 𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑑𝑑
(55,55 + 𝑡𝑡)�

(5.11)

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
(55,55 + 𝑡𝑡) + 𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑑𝑑
(55,55 + 𝑡𝑡)�.

First, we compute the probability of the couple moving out of the property. The couple will
need to move out of the property only when both are functionally disabled, one of them is dead
and the other one is functionally disabled, or both are dead. As the sum of the probabilities of
staying in the property and moving out of the property equals one, by rearranging the equation,
the probability of staying in the property can be obtained. Therefore, to pay RMB 1 of longterm care insurance premium, the proportion of the property to sell is:
𝜅𝜅 = 𝐻𝐻

1

𝜔𝜔
𝑡𝑡
0 ×�1−∑𝑡𝑡=1 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ×𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅×(1+𝑔𝑔) ×Pr(stay in the homet )�
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.

(5.12)

B.3.5 Data sources
Variable

Value

Note

Source

House price growth
(p.a.)

5.00%

Annual house price growth in over 70
cities in China was 4.2% p.a. during
2005-2018. We round up to 5% p.a.

Residential Property Prices
for China
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ser
ies/QCNN628BIS
Retrieved on 20 January
2019.

Long-term care cost
inflation (p.a.)

5.00%

The main cost of long-term care is the
residential cost (Kalseth and
Halvorsen, 2020). Therefore, we
assume it has the same growth as the
house price growth.

Rental yield (p.a.)

1.80%

The rental yield of the major cities in
China is around 1.8% in 2018.

Gross rental yields
https://www.globalpropertyg
uide.com/Asia/china/RentalYields
Retrieved on 20 January
2019.

Long-term care cost
in 2018 (Tier 1
cities)/month

RMB 11,500
(USD 1,710)

Long-term care cost
in 2018 (Tier 2
cities)/month

RMB 9,500
(USD 1,410)

Discount rate (p.a.)

3.50%

Tier 1 cities are Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, and other
cities included in this study are Tier 2
cities.

Cost of residential nursing
home per month
https://www.daojia.com/jiag
e/bj/yanglaoyuan/

The cost is calculated from the
average of each Tier.

Retrieved on 12h January
2019.

Current inter-bank rates

https://tradingeconomics.co
m/china/interbank-rate
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